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ROUTE EXIT REGULATION UNDER THE
AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT:
THE IMPACT OF FUEL COST AND AVAILABILITY
LucY JOHNSON
F ROM ITS INFANCY in the 1920's, the airline industry of
the United States was fundamentally influenced by regulatory
activities of the federal government.' Although such governmental
regulation was not unique to the airline industry, the emergence of
extensive deregulation of the industry is unparalleled. On October
24, 1978, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (the Deregula-
tion Act or Act)' became law and marked the first deregulation
of an entire previously regulated United States industry in recent
history.' The Deregulation Act brought profound changes affect-
ing airline regulation in five principal areas: policy of the Civil
Aeronautics Board (the CAB or Board); entry of existing air
carriers into new routes; certification of new carriers; flexibility
'"An industry may be regulated for a variety of economic and noneconomic
reasons, but, basically, regulation is applied when it is felt that private enterprise
cannot be relied on to provide adequate service at a reasonable price." C.
PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 44 (1965).
A brief review of the early legislation regulating aircraft design and safety,
including the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, may be particularly helpful in evaluation of the current statutory provisions
and possible legislative reform. See W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA:
EFFECTS AND IMPERFECTIONS (1970); Hamstra, Two Decades-Federal Aero-
Regulation in Perspective, 12 J. AIR L. & COM. 105 (1941); Comment, "De-
regulation"-Has it Finally Arrived? The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 44
J. AIR L. & CoM. 799 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
'Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. SS
1301-1302, 1305-1308, 1324, 1341, 1371-1373, 1374, 1376, 1378-1382, 1386,
1389, 1461, 1471, 1473, 1482, 1490-1504) (Supp. 1979)).
'FORTUNE, Nov. 20, 1978, at 38. In signing the Deregulation Act, President
Carter professed the hope that the legislation would be a "precursor" to steps
to "minimize regulation" in "other overregulated industries." Because heavy regu-
latory burdens have arguably become an important source of inflation, airline
deregulation could create an immense impact on a large segment of American
business. Id. According to President Carter, there is a "pressing need" to abolish
the unwarranted regulations that fuel double digit inflation. Dallas Morning
News, Jan. 12, 1980, at 28A, col. 3.
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of air fare determination; and reduction and termination of air
carrier services.'
In passing the Deregulation Act, Congress clearly intended to
allow the air transportation industry to function primarily ac-
cording to market forces rather than governmental regulation.'
Although the thrust of the Act is deregulation, the provisions of
the Act concerning reduction, suspension and termination of air
service in conjunction with the provisions guaranteeing small com-
munity air service subvert the spirit of the Act by allowing the
CAB to maintain vast regulatory control. Under the Act, essen-
tial air transportation is guaranteed for ten years to all points
considered "eligible" with federal subsidy provided where neces-
sary." The Board adopted guidelines," effective September 7, 1979,
to be used flexibly as "a framework for individual determinations"'
of essential air transportation for these points. The Act also allows
additional points to qualify for guaranteed essential air transporta-
tion if they meet the criteria established by the Board" as of Jan-
uary 1, 1980.
The liberal guidelines for determining essential service levels
and the unsparing criteria for designating eligible points reflect
the CAB's concern that some small communities cannot rely on
market forces to ensure their air transportation needs." Supporters
4 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, AIR
TRANSPORTATION REGULATORY REFORM (1978) [hereinafter cited as REGULATORY
REFORM].
'44 Fed. Reg. 52,645, 52,647 (1979).
'See Comment, supra note 1, at 814-15, 821.
749 U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)(5), 1389(g) (Supp. 1979). Section 419(a)(2)(A)
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requires the Board to determine the essential
air transportation level for approximately 555 eligible points by October 24,
1979. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389 (Supp. 1979); Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646 (1979).
'Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,659-60 (1979) (to be codified in 14
C.F.R. § 398).
9Id. at 52,646.
0Proposed Part 270, 44 Fed. Reg. 59,242, 59,245 (1979). Section 419(b)
(2)(A) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requires the Board to establish, by
rule, objective criteria for designation of these additional eligible points. 49
U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1979).
"Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,645, 52,647 (1979). In the preface of the
guidelines, the CAB noted that the congressional intent in establishing the
small community air service program "was to ensure service at the small points




of the CAB's generous approach argue that the cost of subsidized
routes is justified by the importance of preventing hardship, in-
convenience and economic loss to citizens of small communities
and in the preservation of the extensive air transportation network
in the United States."' Although valid concerns support these argu-
ments,13 the relentlessly escalating cost of fuel and its current
shortage challenge the viability of guaranteeing liberal amounts
of subsidized air service for ten years. This comment provides a
2 See Dupre, A Thinking Person's Guide to Entry/Exit Deregulation in the
Airline Industry, 9 TRANSP. L.J. 273, 277-82 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dupre].
Advocates of continued regulatory control over airline route exits contend
that less regulation would eliminate or substantially reduce air service to small
communities. Senator George McGovern, one of the primary proponents of this
view, has stated:
I cannot speak for other States-but I can tell you that in South
Dakota neither our State nor the individual communities involved
have the resources to pay an airline to stop .... Our principal car-
rier-North Central Airlines- has put us on notice that they will
provide service only so long as the operating subsidy is continued.
If that is terminated or substantially reduced, they will withdraw
their equipment. The scenario is clear. The CAB will permit the
withdrawal only if a smaller commuter type carrier, judged to be
"fit, willing and able" can pick up service. That will destroy the
hub-spoke regional airport concept that we have slowly built in
our State basically since the end of World War II. As boardings
fall off-the CAB will then make a new determination that "essen-
tial air service" is not required-and all service, subsidized or
not, will be suspended. South Dakota and other rural states will
then be left in the backwaters of commercial aviation-denied
access to the supposedly national airways transportation system.
Hearings on the Impact of Airline Deregulation on Service to Small and Medium
Sized Communities Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1979) (state-
ment of Senator George McGovern).
13 But see Dupre, supra note 12, at 283 n.57:
The argument used to justify [service to small communities] as a
valid goal starts from the premise that these communities provide
net benefits to society as a whole which in turn warrants a return
of this value to the communities in the form of a subsidy. In
economic terms, society as a whole (here personified as air travelers
in other markets) receives a benefit from the small community for
which it should pay. Similarly, the direct benefit that these com-
munities receive in the form of air service is worth less than the
direct cost of providing that service. Thus, the direct cost of that
service is equal to some lower dollar figure plus the intangible value
that the community bestows upon society.
The benefit that such communities bestow upon society generally
consists of providing a convenient home for a particular economic
enterprise which is seeking cost advantages not available elsewhere
in order to survive economically. . . . Thus, justification of the
goal of service to small communities is questionable.
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framework for objective analysis of the Deregulation Act's pro-
visions which continue to regulate reduction, suspension and termi-
nation of air carrier service. The guidelines for individual deter-
minations of essential air service to small communities are exam-
ined, along with the criteria for designating points eligible for
such service. The impact of fuel cost and availability is considered,
with a critical review of the arguments for and against continued
regulatory control, as well as possible ramifications of both preser-
vation of the existing regulatory scheme and suggested legislative
reform.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CAB REGULATION OF ROUTE EXITS
Since its creation in 1938, the CAB has shaped the air trans-
portation industry of the United States through its vast regulatory
powers."' Established by Congress to protect the growing aviation
industry from private industry market forces considered to be
hazardous," the Board possessed power for forty years to con-
trol entry into the airline business, the fares which airlines charged,
and the routes which airlines were permitted to fly."6 In the per-
formance of its powers and duties, the CAB is required by congres-
sional mandate to consider factors of public interest, convenience,
and necessity." Consistent with these factors, the CAB traditionally
has encouraged expansion of air service to maintain a compre-
hensive system of scheduled service for small communities and iso-
lated areas as well as major urban and regional areas. 8 In order to
insure comprehensive service, particularly to small communities
4 See generally 49 U.S.C. § 1324 (1976).
"The Depression of the 1930's significantly affected the instigation of this
protective approach and the regulatory provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938). See Comment, An Examination of Tradi-
tional Arguments on Regulation of Domestic Air Transport, 42 J. AIR L. & COM.
187 (1976); see generally Jones, The Anomaly of the Civil Aeronautics Board
in American Government, 20 J. AIR L. & COM. 140 (1953).
16Cohen, New Air Service and Deregulation: A Study in Transition, 44 J.
AIR L. & COM. 695, 696 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
"749 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (Supp. 1979). See generally Pillai, Government Regu-
lation in the Private Interest, 40 J. AIR L. & COM. 29 (1974).
"See 49 U.S.C.A. S 1302(a) (8) (Supp. 1979). One of the general factors for
consideration of public interest and public convenience and necessity is the
"maintenance of a comprehensive and convenient system of continuous scheduled
airline service for small communities and for isolated areas, with direct Federal
assistance where appropriate." Id.
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and isolated areas where providing service was often unprofitable,
the Board has exercised regulatory authority over reduction, sus-
pension, and termination of certified air carrier service."
The statute governing abandonment of air service routes prior
to enactment of the Deregulation Act stated that no air carrier
"shall abandon any route, or part thereof, for which a certificate
has been issued by the Board, unless, upon the application of
such air carrier, after notice and hearing, the Board shall find
such abandonment to be in the public interest."' Total abandon-
ment of an unprofitable or undesirable route rarely occurred be-
cause, although such abandonment might clearly have been in
the carrier's best interest, the carrier could not easily show that
the route abandonment was in the public's best interest.1 The
CAB relieved the burden which these routes placed on trunk
carriers by allowing transfers of such routes to local service car-
riers which were subsidized where necessary by the federal gov-
ernment.' Such transfers of route authority were conditioned
upon a CAB finding that the transfer was consistent with the
public interest.'
Because questions concerning the propriety and efficiency of
the CAB's regulatory powers are as old as the Board itself," the
topic of deregulation of the airline industry has been debated
"' See Snow, Aviation Regulation: A Time for Change, 41 J. AIR L. & COM.
637, 658-60 (1975).
- 49 U.S.C. § 1371(j) (1976). See also 49 U.S.C. S 1302 (1976) (matters
considered in the public interest).
21 REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 4, at 13. The regulatory power of the
Board caused virtually all carriers to provide service for certain routes which
were unprofitable or only marginally profitable. Cohen, supra note 16, at 696.
Although certificated air carriers deleted or suspended service to approximately
200 points during the years prior to enactment of the Deregulation Act, the
regulatory provisions of the CAB prevented carriers from developing route
systems based exclusively on economic considerations. Id.2 Several methods for subsidy determination have been adopted and subse-
quently discontinued. See generally Local-Service Class Subsidy Rate Investiga-
tion, 34 C.A.B. 416 (1961); G. EADs, TuE LOCAL SERVICE AiRLINE EXPERIMENT
(1972). Prior to enactment of the Deregulation Act, subsidy awards to these
eligible carriers were based upon the system-wide operating costs and revenues
of each. See REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 4, at 13.
"49 U.S.C. S 1371(h) (1976).
2'See Heymsfeld, Deregulation of Air Transportation under the Aviation Act
of 1975, 9 AKRON L. REV. 643 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Heymsfeld].
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exhaustively. ' Prior to enactment of the Deregulation Act, pro-
ponents of deregulation contended that CAB control over entry
into the airline industry, fares, and route structure depressed com-
petition and stifled industry initiative." They believed that deregula-
tion would produce lower fares and would not jeopardize either the
quality of air service or the stability of the airline industry."
Proponents on the other side of the debate argued that a balanced
system of air transportation in all geographic areas, the health
and well-being of the country, and national security necessitated
continued regulatory control of the industry."
In late 1974 and early 1975, the Senate Subcommittee on Ad-
ministrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the
Judiciary, chaired by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, conducted
hearings concerning the role of the CAB in the regulation of com-
mercial air transportation." The Subcommittee unanimously recom-
mended that federal regulation of the domestic airlines industry
must be "drastically reduced" in order to serve the public interest
to the greatest possible degree.' Legislative efforts to deregulate
the industry reflect a variety of provisions and transition periods."
In October of 1975 the Ford Administration submitted the Avia-
"See generally 40 Fed. Reg. 28,747-83 (1975).
"DeSaussure, The Impact of Governmental Regulation on Air Transporta-
tion, 9 AKRON L. REV. 629 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DeSaussure]. Proponents
of deregulation cited, for example, the fact that between 1938 and 1978 the
Board failed to authorize a new major carrier. This failure was not due to a
lack of applications, since seventy-nine had been submitted since 1950. Ken-
nedy, The American Airlines Industry and the Necessity of Deregulation, 9
AKRON L. REV. 631, 631-32 (1976). The network of national trunk or major
routes was served by ten airlines, with five of these, United, Trans World,
American, Eastern, and Delta, sharing 70% of the total domestic market.
DeSaussure, supra, at 629.
"See Heymsfeld, supra note 24.
"DeSaussure, supra note 26, at 629-30. "If the public wants assurance of
the full range of needed air services, at lowest cost, it must accept the fact that
[the airlines'] underlying economics are more those of a public utility than of
the corner grocery store. And it must accept the consequent need for regulation
of normal marketplace forces." Brenner, Need for Continued Economic Regula-
tion of Air Transport, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 793, 813 (1975).
"Hearing on the Oversight of the Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and
Procedures Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice of the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
"Kennedy, supra note 26, at 633.
"See generally Keyes, A Comparison of Two Proposals for Regulatory
Change, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 727 (1975).
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tion Act of 197582 to Congress. The Act called for a substantial
reduction of CAB control over air carrier fare levels and route
entry and exits over a five-year period.' Senator Kennedy subse-
quently introduced the Air Transportation Act of 1976, which
provided for a four-year transition into fundamental deregulation
of the industry?' Gradual deregulation over a ten-year period was
proposed in yet another bill introduced by Senators Pearson and
Baker.'
Without waiting for legislative mandate, the CAB in 1975
terminated the requirement of group or club membership as a
condition for receipt of cheaper fares for charter flight passengers."
This signaled not only liberalization of its own regulatory policies
but also a significant step toward deregulation."' When Alfred E.
Kahn became Chairman of the CAB in June of 1977,' he set out
"to remove the meddling, protective and obstructionist hand of
government, and to restore this industry, in so far as the law
permits, to the rule of the market."' As Kahn's efforts to relax
CAB regulatory policies began,"° congressional debate over de-
regulation continued.
II. CAB REGULATION OF ROUTE EXITS UNDER THE
DEREGULATION ACT
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,' ' a compromise of the
Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act of 1978 ' ' and the
Air Service Improvement Act of 1978,' was passed and signed by
32 S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
'Id. §§ 9, 14. See generally Heymsfeld, supra note 24; Levine, Alterna-
tives to Regulation: Competition in Air Transportation and the Aviation Act of
1975, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 703 (1975).
I'S. 3364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 481 (1976).
2'S. 292, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1977).
-' 14 C.F.R. § 378 (1978).
"See Comment, supra note 1, at 806.
8 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 758 (May 23, 1977).
39 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 6, 1978, at 37.
4' See Comment, supra note 1, at 807.
41 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. §§
1301-1542 (Supp. 1979)).
42See S. 2493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 124 CONG. REC.
S5900 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1978).
43 H.R. 12611, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
10351980] COMMENTS
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President Carter on October 24, 1978. The Act significantly alters
the regulatory structure of the airline industry and calls for gradual
deregulation over a ten-year period." Although the purpose and
thrust of the Act logically appears to be deregulation,' the pro-
visions concerning reduction, suspension, and termination of serv-
ice in conjunction with the provisions guaranteeing small com-
munity air service ' allow continued regulation of route exits until
October 24, 1988." Under the terms of the Act, no certified air
carrier shall:
terminate or suspend all air transportation which it is providing
to a point under such certificate; or reduce any such air trans-
portation below that which the Board has determined to be
essential air transportation for such point; unless such air carrier
has first given the Board, any community affected, and the State
agency of the State in which such community is located at least
90 days notice of its intent to so terminate, suspend, or reduce
such air transportation."
The Act also provides that if a certified carrier seeks to abandon
or reduce nonstop or single-plane service between two points and
is the only certified carrier providing such service, it must notify the
CAB and each directly affected community no less than sixty days
prior to abandonment or reduction of service.' Uncertified and
unsubsidized carriers must provide the CAB with at least thirty
days notice. 1 If the Board has not found a replacement carrier by
the end of the appropriate notice period, it is authorized to require
the carrier to provide subsidized essential air transportation level
service to the eligible point for subsequent thirty-day periods until
a substitute carrier is found."' If it appears that an eligible point
-49 U.S.C.A. 5 1389(g) (Supp. 1979). See generally Cohen, supra note 16;
see also CONSUMER REPORTS, May 1978, at 284 (summary of the Act's benefits
to air travelers).
'See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a)(9) (Supp. 1979).
"Id. 5 1371(i).
471d. 5 1389. See Comment, supra note 1, at 812.




"1Id. § 1389(a) (6). After the date on which the carrier seeks to suspend or
abandon service, the Board will subsidize the continued service so that the
minimum essential service level may be maintained. Id. § 1389(a)(7).
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will not receive the minimum essential service level without subsidy
after January 1, 1983, the CAB must give notice of its intention
to take applications from carriers willing to provide continued
subsidized service to such point." If a carrier shows the Board
that it can provide substantially improved air service and reduce
the amount of required subsidy to continue essential service, the
CAB must grant its application." If a replacement carrier cannot
be found, the CAB will continue to subsidize the incumbent carrier
and provide limited compensation for its losses."
Simply stated, under the prior law an airline could not abandon
any route for which a certificate had been issued by the Board
unless the Board found abandonment to be in the public interest."
Under the Deregulation Act, an airline may abandon a certificated
route if it provides the CAB with requisite advance notice"7 and
if abandonment is consistent with the CAB's determination of the
minimum service level to guarantee "essential air transportation.""'
Thus, while much of the Board's authority over reduction and
suspension of air service under the prior law was based on the
elusive standard of "public interest," its authority under the De-
regulation Act is focused in its power to determine what constitutes
"essential air transportation."
Under the small community air service provisions"' of the De-
regulation Act, the CAB is empowered to guarantee essential air
transportation to communities which qualify as "eligible points,""0
"Ild. § 1389(a)(11).
5 Id. When reviewing carrier applications, the CAB must consider the de-
sirability of developing an integrated linear air transportation system and the
applicants' experience in providing scheduled air service in the vicinity of the
affected communities. The Board must also solicit and "give great weight" to
the opinions of the community affected by the proposed carrier replacement. Id.
S 1389(a)(11)(C).
55Id. S 1389(a)(7)(B) & (C). Whether or not the Board can contract with
a subsidized carrier to provide service for a specified period, thus avoiding the
need to search for a replacement carrier, remains an open question. CIVIL AERo-
NAUTICS BOARD, SUMMARY OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978, at 17
(1978).
5649 U.S.C. S 1371(j) (1976).
5749 U.S.C.A. § 1371(j) (Supp. 1979).
-Id. 5 1389(f).
59Id. 5 1389.
60Id. § 1389(a)(1), (b)(1).
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with federal assistance provided where necessary."1 These provi-
sions are intended to ensure a continued level of essential air serv-
ice to meet small community needs as CAB control over route
structures decreases."2 The Act defines "essential air transportation"
as "scheduled air transportation of persons to a point provided
under such criteria as the Board determines satisfies the needs of
the community concerned for air transportation to one or more
communities of interest and insures access to the Nation's air
transportation system at rates, fares, and charges which are not
unjust." 3 Provisions of the Act require the CAB to determine
the level of air service which is essential to each point deemed
"eligible."'" Any point in the United States automatically qualifies
as an "eligible point" if on October 24, 1978, it was served by a
certificated carrier or if such service was authorized but had been
suspended. 3 With respect to those eligible points served by more
than one certified air carrier on October 24, 1978, which subse-
quently receive service by not more than one such carrier, the
CAB must determine what constitutes essential air transportation
within six months after notification of the reduction in service."
The Act further required the CAB to determine by October 24,
1979, what constitutes essential air transportation for those eligible
points served by not more than one certified air carrier on October
24, 1978." In both cases the CAB was required to consider the
views of any interested community and appropriate state agencies."
A. Guidelines for Individual Determinations of Essential Air
Transportation
The CAB adopted guidelines, effective September 7, 1979, to
be used in determining essential air service for points eligible under
a' Id. § 1389(d).
62 Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,661 (1979).
63 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(f) (Supp. 1979).
" Id. § 1389(a)(2)(A).
'
5 1d. § 1389(a)(1). Route suspension may occur for a variety of reasons.
Unprofitable operation does not in itself mandate suspension because many un-
profitable routes act as "feeders" for other more lucrative ones. Dupre, supra
note 12, at 283 n.60.




the small community air service provisions of the Deregulation
Act." The Act guarantees this level of service for each eligible
community and provides for federal subsidy where needed.' Prior
to adoption of the guidelines, a controversy arose over whether
the Board should establish guidelines to be used as policy state-
ments or whether it should establish criteria, against which the
relevant data and circumstances of individual communities could
be measured. 1 Determining that specific criteria would be im-
practical and might constitute rigid "national standards," the CAB
developed guidelines to be used flexibly as "a framework for indi-
vidual determinations, not as an ironclad formula.""
The guidelines established by the CAB to be used in the deter-
mination of essential air transportation for eligible points focus on
the number and designation of hubs, specification of airports and
equipment, frequency and time of flights, maximum capacity
guarantee, and the number of stops permitted."' In the CAB's
guidelines, the essential unit of measurement is the "hub," defined
by the Board as "any point enplaning more than 0.05 percent of
the total enplanements in the United States."'7 The Board generally
requires service to only one hub for an eligible point, but only if
that hub satisfies the needs of that point for convenient and suffi-
cient access to the national air system.' In determining whether a
hub affords acceptable access, the Board considers such factors
as the number of carriers which service the hub, the total opera-
tional level of the hub, and historic traffic patterns.7" If an eligible
"Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,659 (1979) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R.
S 398).
7049 U.S.C.A. S 1389(a)(4) (Supp. 1979).
"'Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646 (1979). The CAB argued that a specific set
of criteria setting forth the precise service level "would not lend itself to a
careful examination of the individual needs and unique circumstances of a com-
munity." Id.
7 2 Id. The CAB policy that each point will be analyzed separately is exempli-
fied in the essential air service level determination for Jamestown, North Dakota,
where the Board specified service requirements to Minneapolis/St. Paul rather
than Fargo, a closer hub, because of the availability of more favorable con-
necting service. Id.
71 id. at 52,659-60 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 398).
74 1d. at 52,659.
7
'1d. See Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,648-49 (1979).
"Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,659 (1979) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R.
10391980] COMMENTS
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point has close commercial, geographical, and political ties to
two hubs and there is sufficient traffic to support service to both,
essential air transportation might be defined as including both
hubs."7 In deciding whether a second hub is required, the CAB's
primary considerations are traffic flows and the location of pri-
mary destinations of the eligible point's traffic."' If passenger de-
mand is insufficient, one round trip per day to both hubs might be
required by the Board if there is adequate community interest."
Essential air service does not generally mandate service to a par-
ticular hub airport, but it may require service to a particular air-
port at an eligible point."'
A specific type or size of aircraft is not generally required by
the guidelines, except that all aircraft must adequately accommo-
date passenger baggage, meet applicable standards of the Federal
Aviation Act, and be conveniently accessible to passengers. 1
Concerning the frequency of service, the Deregulation Act re-
quires that for eligible points in all states except Alaska, the
minimum level of service which will comply with the guaranteed
essential air transportation standards is two daily round trips five
days per week, or the 1977 service level, whichever is less.'
§ 398.2). For Alaskan service, the CAB may require only that service from an
eligible point be to a focal traffic point in the area of the eligible point. Id.
7 Id. Prior to adoption of the guidelines, the CAB received some comments
advocating service to two hubs where traffic flows in two directions, with only
a single connecting hub. It was determined that the use of two hubs would split
the eligible point's traffic, decreasing the benefit of the guaranteed service. id.
at 52,649.
7" Id. at 52,649. The Board will examine alternate hubs if a large portion of
a hub's traffic cannot be conveniently served by connecting service. Id.
79 Id. at 52,659 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 398.2).
60 Id. (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. 5 398.3). The Board will consider requests
for individual airport service on a case by case basis. In circumstances where
a community prefers service to a particular airport, the CAB will give special
consideration to carriers proposing service to that airport when selecting from
among carrier applicants. Id. at 52,649-50.
81 1 d. at 52,659-60 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 398.4). A pilot and copilot
and an aircraft with two engines are necessary in servicing all routes in Alaska
and in communities which have agreed to alternate arrangements. Pressurized and
air conditioned aircraft are required when "absolutely necessary." Id. The De-
partment of Transportation rejected a contention that two-engine aircraft and
two pilots are necessary for safety reasons under all circumstances. Id. at 52,650.
8249 U.S.C.A. § 1389(f) (Supp. 1979). In Alaska, the "essential air trans-
portation" standard is set at the 1976 service level or two round trips per week
to each designated hub, whichever is greater. The level is, however, subject to
adjustment agreements after consultation with the affected community. Id.
The Board subsequently determined that weekend service, par-
ticularly Sundays, is necessary to provide essential air service."
These guidelines therefore require "at least two round-trip flights
on each weekday and two round trips over the weekend from the
eligible point to the designated hub," unless the point was receiving
service below that level in 1977 and could not support such service
at fifty percent average load factors.' If historic traffic data indi-
cates that a greater level of service is required or if more flights
become necessary, the essential service level will be increased." If
traffic levels vary with the season, a two-tiered service level is to
be established." Flexibility in the timing and scheduling of flights
is reflected by the Board's general qualification that flights must
depart at "reasonable" times." The Board does, however, require
that if traffic is primarily local to and from a hub there should be
at least one flight in the morning and one during the late afternoon
or evening."
The maximum available flight capacity which may be guaranteed
by the Board is 160 available seats each day for an eligible point,
80 seats in each direction; however, more than 160 seats may be
guaranteed if the eligible point is extremely isolated, if large air-
craft are necessary for effective service, or if other special circum-
stances exist." Only two stops are allowed in the provision of
"44 Fed. Reg. 52,651-52 (1979).
"Id. at 52,660 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. S 398.5). In the original
guidelines, the minimum average load factor was set at 60%-65%. The CAB
amended the guidelines, effective November 14, 1979, setting the minimum
average load factor at 50%. The effect of the amendment is to increase the
maximum capacity of guaranteed service to an eligible point from 60 to 80
seats in each direction. See Amendment to Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,584 (1979).
"Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,660 (1979) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 398.5).
"Id.
"Id. (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. S 398.7).
88 Id. The Board created the guideline provisions on the premise that "[t]iming
and scheduling requirements that are too specific will hinder rather than assist
the development of viable and responsive air transportation." A comment to the
CAB by a carrier, however, stating that the morning and late afternoon/evening
flight requirement was too burdensome was dismissed by the Board. Id. at 52,653.
9 Amendment to Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,584, 65,585 (1979) (to be codified
in 14 C.F.R. § 398.6). As originally adopted, the guidelines provided that a
maximum of 120 available seats each day would be guaranteed to an eligible
point (60 each way). Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,660 (1979) (to be
codified in 14 C.F.R. 5 398.6). In conjunction with its decision to decrease the
load factor from 65% to 50%, the Board increased the maximum available
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essential air service between an eligible point and a hub, unless
an alternative agreement is made with the community." One-stop
or nonstop service may be required where necessary, particularly
in short-haul markets." A turnaround service is required by the
CAB if necessary to provide an adequate capacity to ensure the
specified level of essential service."
B. Criteria for Designating Eligible Points
In addition to those points which were automatically eligible for
guaranteed essential air transportation due to their certification
for service on October 24, 1978," the Act provides guaranteed
essential air transportation for certain other communities. Com-
munities that were deleted from certified carrier service between
July 1, 1968, and October 24, 1978, communities that lost
certificated service as a result of being hyphenated or shared with
another community, and certain points in Alaska and Hawaii
may become eligible for guaranteed essential air transportation."'
The Deregulation Act required the CAB to establish by January
1, 1980, the criteria for determining which of the deleted commu-
nities and points in Alaska and Hawaii should qualify as eligible
points." By January 1, 1982, the Board must complete its review
of the deleted communities and designate those which qualify for
guaranteed essential service." After January 1, 1982, the Board
may designate eligible points from applicants in Alaska and
Hawaii." Communities designated as eligible points through these
seating capacity. Amendment to Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,584, 65,585 (1979)
(to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 398).
" Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,660 (1979) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R.
398.8). For eligible points in Alaska, more than two stops may be allowed
if required due to low traffic levels or a long distance between the eligible point
and the hub. Id.
"1 Id. The Board disagreed with the contention of Piedmont Airlines that the
maximum number of stops should be relaxed when carriers operate larger air-
craft. Id. at 52,653.
91 Id. at 52,660 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. S 398.8).
349 U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)(1) (Supp. 1979).
"
4 Id. § 1389(b)(1) (deleted points and Alaska/Hawaii points); 44 Fed. Reg.
59,243 (1979) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 270.2) (hyphenated points).
949 U.S.C.A. S 1389(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1979).
Id. 5 1389(b) (2) (B).
97 1d. S 1389(b)(2)(C).
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criteria established by the CAB will be guaranteed a specified level
of essential air transportation to the same extent as communities
which were certificated for air service on October 24, 1978."
The Deregulation Act required the CAB to consider specific
factors in establishing the criteria used for designating deleted
communities and points in Alaska and Hawaii as points eligible for
guaranteed essential air transportation." These considerations,
which may be modified by subsequent rules, include such factors
as the actual and potential level of traffic generated by a particular
point, the cost of subsidized essential air transportation to that
point, alternative available means of transportation for residents
of that point, and the degree of isolation of that point from the
national air transportation system." The criteria proposed by the
CAB on October 9, 1979, 1 for communities in the forty-eight
contiguous states focus primarily on considerations of isolation
and traffict0  and specify that a community will not be designated
as an eligible point if it is less than thirty miles from a hub air-
port. Communities which are at least thirty but not less than
sixty road miles from a hub airport will be deemed eligible if
the community enplanes or possesses the potential for enplaning
twenty passengers each day during five days of the week." ' A
community sixty or more road miles from a hub airport will be
deemed an eligible point if it currently or potentially enplanes ten
passengers each day during five days of the week.' If a commu-
nity is less than twenty road miles from the airport of a point
0" Proposed Part 270, 44 Fed. Reg. 59,242, 59,243 (1979).
-49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(b)(2) (A) (Supp. 1979).
100Id.
101 Proposed Part 270, 44 Fed. Reg. 59,242, 59,245 (1979).
'0 Id. at 59,243.
103 Id. at 59,245 (proposed 14 C.F.R. § 270.10). The Board has acknowledged
the difficulty in determining a specific distance at which access to the national
air transportation system is no longer "reasonably" convenient, but proposed
thirty road miles as an objective criterion. Id. at 59,243.
10Id. at 59,245 (proposed 14 C.F.R. S 270.11). This CAB proposal is based
on the premise that competition from alternative transportation methods is more
acute in short-haul markets, so that higher traffic levels would be necessary for
commuter services to become self-supporting. Id. at 59,244.
'"Id. at 59,245 (proposed 14 C.F.R. S 270.11). The Board considered and
has tentatively rejected the use of a separate criterion for communities isolated
by 100 or 150 road miles from a hub, because few deleted communities would
be in this category. Id. at 59,244.
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which automatically qualified as eligible for guaranteed essential
air transportation due to its certification for service on October
24, 1978, it will not be designated as an eligible point.1"
No communities in Hawaii were deleted from service between
July 1, 1968, and October 24, 1978."" Under the proposed cri-
teria, Hawaiian communities may be designated as eligible points
if they meet the criteria for the forty-eight contiguous states. '
The criteria proposed for determining points eligible for guaranteed
essential air service in Alaska are not based on the degree of
isolation, since all Alaskan communities are relatively isolated. '
The unique circumstances of air travel in Alaska prompted the
Board's use of the actual or potential traffic levels of a community
as "the only relevant criterion in Alaska. 11
0
11. THE IMPACT OF FUEL COST AND AVAILABILITY
ON CAB REGULATIONS
Prior to enactment of the Deregulation Act, the CAB provided
subsidies to certificated carriers under section 406 of the Federal
Aviation Act,1 ' which authorized compensation for the carriage
of mail. Recognizing that the subsidies often bore no relation to
mail transportation,"' the Deregulation Act amended section 406
to phase out its subsidy provisions by January 1, 1986."u The Act
added a new subsidy program in section 419 which was designed
to emphasize the ten-year guarantee of essential air transportation
to qualifying small communities rather than the sustenance of
local carriers." Under the new program provisions, when the
1Id. at 59,245 (proposed 14 C.F.R. S 270.12).
107 See id. at 59,243-44.
108 Id. at 59,245 (proposed 14 C.F.R. 5 270.12).
10 Id. at 59,244.
110 Id.
11149 U.S.C. 5 1376 (1976).
112 It has been suggested that the relation of the section 406 subsidy program
to the transportation of mail was simply a "polite fiction." CIVIL AERONAUTICS
BOARD, SUMMARY OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978, at 15 (1978).
11349 U.S.C.A. § 1376(c) (Supp. 1979).
114 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, SUMMARY OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
OF 1978, at 15 (1978). Before the enactment of section 419, the Board was re-
quired to consider a certificated carrier's overall system needs when determining
a subsidy, and the Board generally was precluded from adjusting the equipment
1044
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Board finds that an eligible point will not receive essential air
service without compensation, it is to invite applications to pro-
vide subsidized service in a manner resembling the typical gov-
ernment procurement process."' While the Board is expected to
keep the subsidy cost at a reasonable level, Congress has not
called for the Board to establish a low bid system since the lowest
bidder may not be the most reliable carrier, and since the Board
is seeking to encourage efficiency with incentives rather than force
cost-cutting measures which could be counterproductive." '
The provisions of the Act and its legislative history leave no
doubt that the subsidy program is to emphasize insuring essential
services rather than minimizing the cost of the program." ' Section
419(d) contains the guidelines for compensation and refers to
"the fair and reasonable amount of compensation required to in-
sure the continuation of essential air transportation. .. .""" Lan-
guage emphasizing the cost of the subsidy program is avoided."'
The Act requires the Board to establish guidelines for computing
compensation to any eligible point based on "representative costs"
of carriers operating aircraft of a type appropriate to provide
essential air transportation to the point in question."* Sharply esca-
or schedules of certificated carriers, which prevented it from helping small com-
munities. Of special significance is the fact that the section 406 subsidy program
was limited to certificated carriers, thus preventing the direct subsidization of
many operators using aircraft more appropriately suited to the needs of small
communities. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, SECTION 419 SUBSIDY PROGRAM, Dis-
CUSSION PAPER 2 (1979).
"'49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(b) (5) (A) (Supp. 1979).
"l CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, SECTION 419 SUBSIDY PROGRAM, DISCUSSION
PAPER 6 (1979). The Board's avoidance of a low bid system is also based on
the notion that the transition of each carrier causes difficulties including loss of
confidence in the system, decreased demand or less growth in demand, initial
performance problems, and long-term development problems. Id.
I Id. at 4. See S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 89, 90 (1978).
11849 U.S.C.A. § 1389(d) (Supp. 1979).
' Under the Deregulation Act, the cost to the federal government of pro-
viding essential air transportation is only one of the factors to be considered
by the Board in designating eligible points. 49 U.S.C.A. S 1389(b) (2) (A) (Supp.
1979).
I" Id. S 1389(d). A variety of methods are available for determining "repre-
sentative costs," including industry averages and cost breakdowns by geographic
areas and carrier capacities. Representative costs are inherently difficult to de-
termine because costs for a particular aircraft may vary greatly in different
geographic areas due to climate, hub congestion, and fuel prices. A further
problem lies in the determination of the proper amount of emphasis to be
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lating fuel prices have had a dramatic impact on these "representa-
tive costs.'.. 1 The spiraling cost of fuel has particularly affected
small carriers which generally purchase fuel at spot or retail prices
typically higher than prevailing contract prices." In order to pro-
vide for fuel costs in the subsidy program, an automatic fuel cost
adjustment has been proposed so that the CAB would cover 85%
of fuel price increases with each subsidized carrier absorbing 15%
of the cost."
In addition to the cost of fuel, the availability of fuel has be-
come an increasingly important concern in meeting essential air
service levels.'" As a means of guaranteeing service, the CAB has
joined forces with the Department of Energy (DOE) to insure
sufficient fuel supplies for carriers providing essential services.'"
placed on how an essential service carrier's costs compare to a specified aver-
age. The question remains open as to whether the Board can require an existing
carrier to continue service to a particular point solely because a prospective
replacement carrier's cost is above the "representative cost." CIVIL AERONAUTICS
BOARD, SECTION 419 SUBSIDY PROrRAM, DISCUSSION PAPER 22 (1979).
"' Aviation fuel costs rose 100% in 1979, from an average of 40 cents per
gallon of jet fuel in 1978 to an average of 80 cents per gallon. Dallas Morning
News, Jan. 27, 1980, S H, at 2, col. 3.
122 In May 1979, commuter airlines using jet fuel paid an average of 61 cents
per gallon while certificated carriers with long-term contracts paid from 37.5
cents to 45 cents per gallon for the same fuel. COMMUTER AIRLINE A. AMER-
ICA TIMES, May 1979, at 4. Whether the spot market can continue to pro-
vide adequate fuel for commuters remains uncertain. At least twenty carriers
have cut back or anticipate cutting back existing service due to a lack of adequate
fuel supplies. COMMUTER AIRLINE A. AMERICA TIMES, Aug. 1979, at 6-7. Even
if spot market fuel is available, its cost also poses a threat to commuter service.
Ransome Airlines' Allegheny Commuter is only one commuter which has been
caught in the bind of excessive retail costs. Ransome sought unsuccessfully to
obtain a guaranteed fuel allocation, but encountered difficulties because of the
practice of oil company suppliers in giving priority to fulfilling prior commit-
ments to major airlines which are traditional customers. Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Oct. 1, 1979, at 27.
m' CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, SECTION 419 SUBSIDY PROGRAM, DISCUSSION
PAPER 26 (1979). Because the Board acknowledges that most small carriers must
purchase fuel on the spot market, this 15% payment by carriers of fuel price
increases is designed to provide incentives for the carriers to keep fuel costs as
low as possible. Id.
124 The unavailability of fuel for commuters could undermine the overall de-
regulation program if commuters cannot get sufficient fuel to grow and become
self-sufficient. COMMUTER AIRLINE A. AMERICA TIMES, Aug. 1979, at 6-7.
125 44 Fed. Reg. 52,659 (1979). The agreement resulted from the growing
problem of commuters in obtaining adequate fuel supplies and the necessity of
guaranteeing essential air transportation to eligible points under the Deregulation
Act. Since the Act became law in October of 1978, more than 130 cities received
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Under the joint agreement, the Board will monitor supplies of
carriers providing essential service, advising the DOE if a carrier
has difficulty obtaining adequate supplies.' The DOE will then
contact the carrier, the fixed base operator, and the fuel supplier
in an effort to obtain more fuel."' If the DOE finds that fuel can-
not be obtained for a potential replacement carrier, the Board
will notify the incumbent carrier that it may not leave the route
until its replacement makes satisfactory supply arrangements, thus
providing an incentive for the incumbent to assist the potential
replacement carrier in obtaining fuel.'" The mandatory transfer
of fuel supplies from an incumbent carrier to a replacement car-
rier has been reviewed by the CAB but is not presently considered
to be feasible because of different fuel requirements for different
types of aircraft and the inherently complex logistical and legal
considerations.'
A. Justification for Continued Regulation
In passing the Deregulation Act, Congress clearly intended to
allow the air transportation industry to function essentially accord-
ing to market forces rather than to rely on governmental regula-
tion." * Yet the ten-year transition period provided by the Deregula-
tion Act, 3' guaranteeing essential air transportation to eligible
small or isolated communities, reflects a concern that these points
often require federal subsidy and cannot rely on forces of the
marketplace to ensure their air transportation needs." Proponents
of the CAB's generous provisions for guaranteed essential air
notice that they were losing services by a certificated carrier, and for 79 of those
points, the departing carrier represented the only certificated carrier providing
service for that point. Since the Board must guarantee essential service, the
commuter carriers are essential to meet the air transportation needs of eligible
points. While the CAB-DOE agreement will help solve the fuel availability
problems of replacement carriers, it provides little help to other carriers. CoM-
MUTER AIRLINE A. AMERICA TIMES, Oct. 1979, at 8.




10 Id. at 52,647; see also S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1978);
S. REP. No. 1374, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1976).
-1'49 U.S.C.A. S 1389(g) (Supp. 1979).
" Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,647 (1979). See S. REP. No. 631, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978).
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transportation and liberal criteria for determination of points
eligible for such service contend that the CAB has properly fol-
lowed the specific congressional mandate to insure essential air
service designed to meet the individual needs of small communi-
ties.'" Proponents of the small community service program main-
tain that special consideration should be given to the carriers pro-
viding essential service, often the only air transportation link to
many of the small communities in the nation.' The fuel needs of
small carriers are arguably negligible in comparison with other
modes of transportation such as automobiles, buses, and railroads
which provide a similar level of service to consumers.1" In regard
to fuel availability, the CAB has concluded that the small com-
munity air service program will not have a significant impact on
the nation's energy problems."
The subsidized fuel cost is arguably justified in the CAB's cost-
sharing subsidy proposals under which carriers have incentives to
keep fuel costs as low as possible.'7 This system will be far superior
to the previously considered fuel adjustment plan, based on indi-
vidual carrier requests, which would have served as a signal to
fuel suppliers to escalate their prices to section 419 carriers, know-
ing that carriers could simply pass, the cost to the government.'"
The fuel cost has also been justified on the premise that the sub-
sidy program is flexible and can easily adapt to changing traffic
patterns.' Within one year after a point receives subsidized serv-
ice, the CAB will begin a review of the essential service level for
" See generally Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,647 (1979); S. REP. No.
631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978). The Board has justified its generous subsidy
program by reference to congressional silence on the issue of a statutory ceiling
for subsidy costs. Id.
'3See COMMUTER AIRLINE A. AMERICA TIMES, Aug. 1979, at 7.
' Id. In 1978 commuter airlines carried over 10 million passengers and
consumed 0.7% of all aviation fuel. Compared to other modes of travel includ-
ing automobiles, buses, and railroads, commuters used 0.06% of all fuel used
in passenger transportation. In terms of fuel conservation, the average com-
muter aircraft is 61% more energy efficient than larger aircraft. COMMUTER
AIRLINE A. AMERICA TIMES, May 1979, at 5.
'3' Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,664 (1979).
'3' See note 123 supra, and accompanying text.
' CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, SECTION 419 SUBSIDY PROGRAM, DISCUSSION
PAPER 26 (1979).
11 See Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,659 (1979).
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that point." After the essential service level for a point is deter-
mined, any person can petition to have the level changed."' A
petition for modification can be filed at any time, and if it demon-
strates a need for reexamination, the determination process begins
again. 14
The Act provides for a ten-year transition period because many
legislators at the time of enactment felt that at least ten years
would be necessary for a smooth transition into a deregulated
environment, so that the newly unshackled airlines would not
be immediately free to drop unprofitable service to small cities.'
A few proponents of the ten-year restraint on exit freedom even
favored further legislation to make route exit more difficult, to
extend the time period for guaranteed service, and to prevent
anticipated air service cutbacks.1" While some initial observers
feared that service to many small communities would be virtually
eliminated under the Act,'" proponents of the Act argued that
the provisions guaranteeing essential air service to eligible points
encourage growth of more efficient commuter air service and
may enable commuters to become self-sufficient.'" According to
CAB member Elizabeth E. Bailey, "the joint effect of our rule-
making and the new legislation should be to encourage commuter
services and also to encourage the smaller trunk and local-surface
carriers to develop new connecting hubs at terminals that now
receive only limited service..''
Although all communities have not benefited since the Act
was passed, more communities are receiving more service than
1'Id. at 52,665 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. 5 325.6).
141 Id. at 52,664 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. 5 325.7).
1" Id. at 52,666 (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. 5 325.10).
14 124 CONG. REc. S5863 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1978) (statement of Senator
McGovern).
I"Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 2, 1979, at 21. Senator McGovern in
particular advocated legislation to limit market exits. Id. See generally Brenner,
supra note 28.
'4Fears of air service cutbacks brought critical responses concerning de-
regulation from Senators Jennings Randolph and Robert Byrd of West Virginia,
George McGovern of South Dakota, and John Stennis of Mississippi. Av. WEEK
& SPACE TECH., Apr. 2, 1979, at 21.
I" See Bus. WEEK, Oct. 30, 1978, at 57.
147 Id.
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before. " A CAB study reveals that 34 hubs and 281 nonhub air-
ports received less service on February 1, 1979, than on that date
in 1978.'" Despite this cutback in service, the CAB and other
supporters of the Act contend that overall service has improved
since enactment of the Act, as evidenced by an increase in service
from nonhubs to hubs.'" These supporters note that even with
subsidized regulation prior to the Act, certified carriers had with-
drawn from 173 points between 1960 and 1976, so that over 30%
of the communities which received certified air service in 1960 had
lost it by 1976."' Additionally, prior to deregulation, small com-
munity service was not always guaranteed and timely notice of
service reduction or termination was not always provided to af-
fected communities.' Proponents of the Act maintain that in a
newly deregulated environment, adjustments must be anticipated
and viewed in a proper perspective." The adjustment which is
currently of chief concern is the soaring cost and generally un-
predictable availability of fuel.'" Proponents of the liberal guide-
lines for guaranteed essential air service and the generous criteria
for designating points eligible for such service cite the joint
CAB-DOE agreement as evidence that proper adjustments can be
made to deal with the problem of cost and availability of fuel.'"
These proponents contend that the Act's provisions concerning
termination, reduction, and suspension of air service, in conjunc-
"I Address by Elizabeth Bailey (CAB member), ITT Key Issues Lecture,
New York University (Dec. 5, 1979) (reprinted by the CAB) at 25. California
communities are an example of points which have generally not benefited from
deregulation. In California previous state regulation and the desire of certificated
carriers to take advantage of new route opportunities elsewhere caused par-
ticularly difficult transition problems for many communities. Id. at 26.
I4 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 2, 1979, at 21. Service at small, nonhub
airports increased 5.2%, while service from nonhubs to small hubs grew by 3.7%,
growth to medium hubs increased by 13.1% and to large hubs by 9.2%, during
1978. Id.
150 Id.
151 122 CONG. REC. 12123 (1976) (remarks of Senator Edward Kennedy).
"[A]lthough service to small communities has actually increased, it has done so
as a result of the services provided by commuter air carriers exempted from
CAB regulation." Id.
"' See Kennedy, supra note 26.
" See Dupre, supra note 12.
"ISee note 122 and accompanying text supra.
"5 See COMMUTER AIRLINE A. AMERICA TIMES, Oct. 1979, at 8.
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tion with the provisions guaranteeing small community service,
create the proper conditions for gradual deregulation of route
exits.1"
B. Criticism of Continued Regulation
The CAB traditionally has encouraged the development of a
comprehensive air transportation network under the congressional
mandate that such a network is "in the public interest, and in
accordance with the public convenience and necessity.'" This
policy is reflected in the provisions of the Deregulation Act which
guarantee essential air transportation to eligible points over a ten-
year transition period.'" Although the Board's goal of promoting
public interest through the "public convenience and necessity'" "
standard is meritorious, a close examination reveals the substantive
dichotomy which it represents.'"
In determining whether these regulatory provisions of the Act
serve the public interest, the dual problem arises of defining who
comprises the "public" and identifying what is in their best "in-
terest..1.. Obviously what may be in the interest of one public
segment may contravene the interests of another public segment."'
Likewise, the "public convenience and necessity" standard is per
se undefinable because it could be reasonably interpreted to mean
almost anything.1" The dichotomy of this standard is patently
evident in that public convenience may bear no relation to public
necessity. Indeed, economic turbulence may prove that public con-
venience and public necessity are inherently inconsistent.
The dilemma of determining what constitutes "public con-
venience and necessity" has been intensified by the increasingly
"See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
1749 U.S.C.A. S 1302(a) (Supp. 1979). One of the general factors for
consideration of public convenience and necessity is the "maintenance of a
comprehensive and convenient system of continuous scheduled airline service
for small communities and for isolated areas, with direct Federal assistance where
appropriate." 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a)(8) (Supp. 1979).1 1 See notes 7-11 and accompanying text supra.
11 49 U.S.C.A. S 1302(a) (Supp. 1979).
10 See Dupre, supra note 12, at 278.
11 Jordan, If We're Going to Regulate the Airlines, Let's Do It Right, in
PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY 58 (J. Miller 1I ed. 1975).
""1Dupre, supra note 12, at 303.
163 Id. at 302.
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critical shortage of fuel and its soaring cost. '" Although the De-
regulation Act arguably might have been adequate to deal with
route exit conditions existing at the time of its enactment, its pro-
visions increasingly appear to be short-sighted. " In the months
since the Act became law, the staggering increase in the price of
fuel and the uncertainty of its availability have profoundly affected
the air transportation industry."' Fuel costs for the airlines rose
100% in 1979 with the fuel bill totaling $6.5 billion, up $2.5
billion over 1978." The shortage of fuel forced several airlines
to dip into the costly spot fuel market to insure an adequate supply
through 1979. "' Although the fuel shortage has caused relatively
few flight cancellations' the general outlook for both cost"' and
availability' 1 of fuel for -the foreseeable future provides little hope
for improvement."' The intense worldwide demand for oil will
'"See note 121 and accompanying text supra.
1The deterioration of relations between the United States and Iran has
caused American airlines to face the prospect of continued high fuel prices and
uncertainty over fuel availability. The specific effects of President Carter's cutoff
of Iranian oil to the United States, ordered in November of 1979, are not im-
mediately apparent. A DOE spokesperson has predicted that "the market will be
tighter than it has been. More fuel will likely end up on the spot market, and the
price will go up." Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 19, 1979, at 30.
' An example of this effect is found in the Southwest Airlines decision to
cancel 180 flights between December 10, 1979, and March 1, 1980, in an effort
to save 1,503,975 gallons of jet fuel. Southwest also instituted a slower en route
cruise speed to conserve an estimated 350,000 gallons each month. Dallas Morn-
ing News, Dec. 8, 1979, § B, at 14, col. 4. Higher fuel prices have forced Trans
World Airlines to further reduce its already scaled-down operating plan for the
spring of 1980. Possible reductions include further lay-offs of employees and
flight cancellations. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 7, 1980, at 25.
107 Dallas Morning News, Jan. 27, 1980, § H, at 2, col. 3.
I" Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 19, 1979, at 30. An alternative to the
spot market fuel purchase arrangement is an airline fuel consortium used to
purchase, store, and transport fuel for the airlines, possibly bypassing the oil
industry. Although the CAB has approved formation of a consortium, sig-
nificant antitrust problems and competitive forces among the airlines may render
this alternative unsuccessful. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 1, 1979, at 27.
'" But see note 166 and accompanying text supra.
17' President Jimmy Carter has stated, "No matter what I do, no matter what
Congress does, no matter what anybody does in the years ahead, the price of
energy is going to go up." President's Address on Energy, 15 WEEKLY COMP.
OF PRES. DOC. 1255 (July 16, 1979).
171 Barton House, aviation fuel specialist for the DOE, has stated "there will
never again be a glut of crude oil. No one will have all he wants .... " Av.
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 5, 1979, at 29.
'
7 See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 10, 1979, at 34.
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undoubtedly continue," while both supply and price will remain
subject to the discretion of oil exporting countries. 7' The ultimate
adequacy of domestic sources remains uncertain. " Thus the spiral-
ing cost of fuel and the uncertainty of its availability mandates a
critical reexamination of the CAB's goal of providing for "public
convenience and necessity" and the provisions of the Deregulation
Act designed to reach that goal.
Because the air transportation industry is important to the over-
all economy of the United States, the individuals and the legisla-
tion governing the industry must be responsive to economic turbu-
lence." ' The CAB has acknowledged that it is aware of the energy
problems which confront the nation, yet it maintains that the
guaranteed subsidized service to eligible points will not have a
"significant impact" on these problems. " This premise is based
upon the fact that much of the guaranteed service is provided by
small commuter aircraft operating on short haul runs using only a
"negligible" amount of fuel.'' The Board has stated simply that
energy concerns will "probably" receive greater importance when
the Board is selecting carriers to provide essential air service.'"
A primary example of the CAB's extravagant attitude concerning
use of available fuel is found in its agreement with the DOE to
insure available fuel supplies for commuter carriers providing
essential air transportation.8 ' Rather than reevaluating the proper
use of fuel and the cost of continued subsidies, the CAB has cre-
ated new regulatory measures, with a proposal that the CAB should
fully cover 85% of fuel price increases while subsidized carriers
absorb only 15% of the cost.'' Continued subsidies may create
perverse incentives for small community air service by encouraging




17' See generally Landry, Some Plain Talk About Airlines and Deregulation,
9 AKRON L. REV. 635 (1976).
177 Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,664 (1979).
178 Commuters Able to Meet Needs of Communities, COMMUTER AIRLINES
A. AMERICA TIMES, Aug. 1979, at 7.
"7'Part 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,664 (1979).
160 See notes 121-124 and accompanying text supra.
181 See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
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and to maintain a normal return through subsidy, rather than to
develop the market and encounter the risk of attracting competi-
tion from other carriers.' If the demands for local air service
become insufficient to cover the cost, the utility of such service may
be difficult to justify.
The possible diversion of oil to other uses is of special sig-
nificance in anticipating future aviation fuel supplies.'" Heating
oil for homes and industry, diesel fuel and motor gasoline must
share available petroleum supplies with aviation gasoline and jet
fuel.'" Aviation fuel production is currently estimated to com-
prise six percent of each available crude oil barrel," but its- future
position in the hierarchy of petroleum priority remains uncer-
tain.'" Although new fuel-efficient and wide-body aircraft may
improve fuel conservation,' the use of alternative fossil fuels in-
cluding synthetic liquid fuels produced from coal and oil shale
ultimately may be the most critical factor in fuel availability.'"
The United States has an abundance of these resources, but the
financial investment in research and development, inherent sys-
tems problems, and environmental considerations pose significant
restrictions to practical foreseeable use of these alternative fuels."'
Alternative energy sources eventually may provide a viable solu-
tion to the current shortage and high cost of fuel, but the prac-
tical use of such alternatives is presently premature,'" reinforcing
the critical need for immediate remedial action.
... CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, SECTION 419 SUBSIDY PROGRAM, DISCUSSION
PAPER 7 (1979).
'13 It has been suggested that the United States government may be happier
keeping people warm than keeping them traveling. Bus. WEEK, May 28, 1979,
at 44.
"8 When aviation gasoline supplies became tight during the summer of 1979,
considerable blame was placed on governmental steps taken to increase the motor
gasoline supply in order to decrease the automobile gasoline lines. Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECH., Sept. 24, 1979, at 52.
'" Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 17, 1979, at 97.
'" The issue of priority positioning has raised significant questions concerning
the political clout of a variety of energy consumers. See Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Sept. 24, 1979, at 52. See also Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 10, 1979,
at 37.
"'
7 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 17, 1979, at 19.
"I Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 10, 1979, at 37.
189 Id.
l90 id. at 43.
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IV. CONCLUSION
While the airline industry in its early years arguably may have
required regulatory legislation to ensure proper growth, the con-
tinuance of extensive regulation at the present time is unjustified.
Advocates of free enterprise challenge the propriety of continued
governmental interference in the airline industry until 1988 through
the regulatory provisions of the Deregulation Act. The provisions
of the Act concerning termination, reduction and suspension of
air service, the liberal guidelines for determining essential service
levels, and the generous criteria for designating points eligible for
guaranteed service controvert the purpose and thrust of the Act.
Preservation of the extensive air transportation network in the
United States has been set forth as a justification for the cost of
subsidized air service, as well as the premise that citizens of small
communities should not experience hardship, inconvenience and
economic loss due to isolation from major urban areas. Although
these justifications are commendable, the increasingly critical
shortage of fuel and the staggering increase in its cost warrant
reformation of the Act. If the ten-year duration of guaranteed
subsidized service were reduced and the terms "eligible point" and
"essential air transportation" were narrowly redefined, the steadily
increasing subsidy cost would be reduced substantially, and avail-
able fuel could be used in other ways. Airlines could concentrate
their resources on routes which provide the greatest opportunity
for profitable operation. By substantial reduction in subsidies and
route exit restraints, local service carriers and commuter airlines
would be forced to develop independently profitable operations.
These carriers would maintain schedules responsive to individual
community transportation needs, not to the CAB's determination
of what constitutes "essential air transportation."
A reduction of the ten-year transition period and a narrow re-
definition of the statutory terms "eligible point" and "essential air
transportation" will require congressional action. Because of the
inherently lengthy legislative process and the congressional man-
date that the Board is to maintain an environment "responsive to
the needs of the public and in which decisions are reached
promptly, 1. 1 the Board must initiate steps to deregulate route exit
19149 U.S.C.A. S 1302(a)(5) (Supp. 1979).
19801 COMMENTS 1055
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
deregulation. Just as the Board did not wait for congressional
mandate to begin deregulation of the industry," it must not wait
for congressional mandate to complete deregulation.
The Act defines essential air transportation as the level of
service which the Board determines to be sufficient to satisfy the
needs of a particular eligible point." Thus, the CAB clearly may
alter its broad guidelines for determining essential air transporta-
tion and its criteria for designing eligible points. A specific initial
step could be a redefinition of the measuring unit of these provi-
sions, the hub. Although it is not practical to remove numerical
considerations from the definition of "hub," it is feasible to en-
large the current criterion of .05% of total enplanements in the
United States.Y Such an increase, for instance a doubling to 1 %,
would reduce the level of required service to a community and
would allow a wider margin for the forces of the market to act.
Additionally, both the requisite frequency of flights and the mini-
mum available equipment capacity to be guaranteed by the Board
could be reduced. These steps would create lower subsidy costs,
conserve fuel, and still ensure the provision of adequate air service.
Perhaps a fresh understanding of the term "essential" will provide
the key to living with not only a newly deregulated airline indus-
try, but also the complexities of the new decade. "Essential" serv-
ice should not include a level of service above that which is
"adequate" to meet community needs. Adequacy should be deter-
mined by market forces rather than governmental fiat.
The CAB has been empowered to develop and maintain "a
sound regulatory environment which is responsive to the needs of
the public and in which decisions are reached promptly in order
to facilitate adaptation of the air transportation system to the
present and future needs of the domestic and foreign commerce
of the United States. . . ."' The route exit provisions of the De-
regulation Act, the CAB's criteria for designating eligible points,
and the guidelines for determining essential air transportation can-
not provide this sound environment and are not responsive to the
192 See text accompanying notes 36 and 37 supra.
113 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
9 See notes 73-74 and accompanying text supra.
19549 U.S.C.A. S 1302(a)(5) (Supp. 1979).
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present and future needs of the United States. Expeditious refor-
mation of the Act will allow the air transportation industry to sur-
vive current economic turbulence and adapt to future conditions.
Such reformation ultimately may prove to be the essence of "public
convenience and necessity."

